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Abstract
What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its
derivation. We argue for an approach focusing on reconstruction rather
than interpretation of quantum mechanics. After discussing the concept
of reconstruction, we analyze the problem of metatheoretic justification of
the choice of axioms and then study several examples of reconstruction.
1 What is wrong with interpreting quantumme-
chanics?
Ever since the first days of quantum mechanics physicists as well as philosophers
tried to interpret it, understanding this task as a problem of giving to the
new, puzzling physical theory a clear meaning. Looking globally, this enterprize
failed: still today we have no consensus on what the meaning of quantum theory
is. Proposed answers are many but none of them has won overall recognition.
Perhaps the most remarkable manifestation of the failure to interpret quantum
mechanics is the attitude taught to most young physicists in lecture rooms
and research laboratories in the last half century, “Write down equations and
calculate! No need to ask questions!”
Why did attempts at univocal interpretation fail? Many answers are pos-
sible, and among them we favor two, both showing that there is an intrinsic
deficiency in the idea of interpreting philosophically a physical theory.
The first answer is that to a physical theory one would naturally like to give a
physical meaning in the Greek sense of ϕυ´σις , i.e. we – as part of the physicists’
audience – expect to be told a story about the immanent, fundamental nature.
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This is because we casually tend to apply physical theory to the phenomenal
world to learn something about the latter, and not the world to physical theory
in order to invent a meaning of the theory. Physical theory is above all a
tool for predicting the yet unobserved phenomena; so employing the existing
knowledge and experience of the world to interpreting physics runs counter
to its basic function as a scientific theory. However, notwithstanding such an
against-the-grain direction in which a philosophical interpretation operates, the
former does not necessarily lead to a formal contradiction that would invalidate
the interpretation logically; more modestly but perhaps no less irritatingly, at
the end one is often left with a feeling of being excluded from the mainstream
research. Further, as the physics of today is inseparable from mathematics, a
meaning cannot be physical and thus satisfactory if it is merely heaped over and
above the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, instead of coming all
the way along with the formalism as it rises in a derivation of the theory.
The second answer is that we live in a situation where objective truth has
been appropriated by science, and to pass public ratification every increase in
knowledge must confront experimental setups. In this world an interpretation
can only then be considered satisfactory when it becomes an integral part of
science. This is not unprecedented in the history of ideas: indeed, many philo-
sophical questions with the advent of empirical science ceased to be perceived as
philosophical and are now treated as scientific. Of the problem of interpreting
quantum mechanics, as much as possible must be moved into the area of the
scientific; only then will the puzzle disappear.
2 Reconstruction of physical theory
2.1 Schema
We call reconstruction a following schema: Theorems and major results of phys-
ical theory are formally derived from simpler mathematical assumptions; these
assumptions or axioms, in turn, appear as a representation in the formal lan-
guage, of a set of physical principles. Thus, reconstruction consists of three
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parts: a set of physical principles, their mathematical representation, and a
derivation of the formalism of the theory.
Contrary to an interpretation, reconstruction of physical theory acquires sup-
plementary persuasive power which arises from the use of mathematical deriva-
tion. Established as a valid mathematical result, the theorems and equations
of the theory become unquestionable and free of suspicion. ’Why is it so?’—
’Because we derived it.’ The question of meaning, previously asked with regard
to the formalism, is removed and now bears only on the selection of the princi-
ples. No room for mystery remains in what concerns the meaning of the theory’s
mathematical apparatus.
2.2 Selection of first principles
That who wishes to attempt a reconstruction of physical theory must formulate
the foundational principles which he or she believes plausible and translate them
into mathematical axioms. Then the rest of the theory will be constructed
“mechanically,” by means of a formal derivation. The choice of axioms must
be the only allowed freedom in the whole construction. It is commonplace to
say that it is not easy to exhibit an axiomatic system that would stand to such
requirements, especially in the case of quantum theory.
First, how does one judge which axioms are plausible? Prior to pronouncing
a judgment, one must develop an intuition of what is plausible about quantum
theory and what is not. This can be only achieved by practicing the theory,
i.e. by taking its prescriptions at face value, applying them to systems under
consideration in particular tasks, and obtaining results. In short, one needs to
acquire a real “know-how” above and beyond the theoretical knowledge that
quantum mechanics could solve such and such problems. Intuition then devel-
ops from experience; it cannot arise from abstract knowledge “in principle.”
However, it is important to say that taking the prescriptions of quantum theory
at face value, applying them and obtaining results will not yet make things clear
about quantum mechanics. One can possess the knowledge about how to apply
a certain tool without caring about the structure of the tool or its meaning. The
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quantum mechanical know-how purely serves as such tool for developing one’s
intuition about which idea is plausible and can become a foundational principle
and which candidate idea will not pass the test.
Second, what shall one require from the first principles? As we stated above,
they must be simple physical statements whose meaning is immediately, easily
accessible to a scientist’s understanding. They must also be such as to permit
a clear and unambiguous translation of themselves into mathematically formu-
lated axioms. A derivation of quantum theory will then rely on these axioms.
2.3 Status of first principles
Reconstruction program includes a derivation of quantum theory, but in the pre-
vious section one was told to apply and use it in order to motivate the derivation.
Is there a logical vicious circle here? We submit that there is none, and this
thanks to the status of first principles. Namely, they should not necessarily
be viewed as ultimate truths about nature. Independently of one’s ontological
commitments, the first principles only have a minimal epistemic status of being
postulated for the purpose of reconstructing the theory in question. Like in the
19th-century mathematics, in theoretical physics the axiomatic method is to
be separated from the attitude which yet the Greeks had toward axioms: that
they represent the truth about reality. Much of the progress of mathematics
is due to understanding that an axiom can no longer be considered ultimate
truth, but merely a basic structural element, i.e. assumption that lies in the
foundation of a certain theoretical structure. In mathematics, after departing
from the Greek concept of axiom, “not only geometry, but many other, even
very abstract, theories have been axiomatized, and the axiomatic method has
become a powerful tool for mathematical research, as well as a means of or-
ganizing the immense field of mathematical knowledge which thereby can be
made more surveyable” [17]. A similar attitude is to be taken with respect to
axioms used for a formal derivation of physical theory. A short prescription
would sound something like this, “If the theory does not tell you that the states
of the system are ontic states, do not take them to be ontic.”
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To explain the above prescription, return first to the idea that, in developing
an intuition with respect to the plausibility of the foundational principles used
to derive a theory, one takes this theory for a given and applies it practically so
as to acquire a know-how that would justify the choice of principles. Now, when
one is working with several physical theories, ideas that have previously been
used as foundational in theory I, may turn out to be derivative (i.e., theorems)
in theory II. A good example comes from the case of thermodynamics and sta-
tistical physics, or macroscale hydrodynamics and low-level molecular theory of
liquids. Such considerations show the limits of philosophical assumptions that
one can make about the status of first principles used in reconstruction of a given
physical theory. Indeed, generically nothing can be said about their ontological
content or the ontic commitments that arise from the principles. It is more
economical and would amount to a certain “epistemological modesty” to treat
the foundational principles as axioms hic et nunc, i.e. in a given theoretical de-
scription. Having taken this position, ask then the reconstructed theory itself if
it allows a realist point of view or imposes limits on it; and while in general the
status of first principles as ultimate truths about reality is not a necessity, cer-
tain reconstruction programs are such that this status can be safely, or almost,
attributed to the principles within a particular reconstruction in question.
Reconstruction of physical theory has its main advantage compared to philo-
sophical interpretation of the theory in that it moves a number of questions,
previously being thought of as philosophical, to the realm of science, and this
in virtue of the mathematical derivation which the reconstruction program op-
erates. However, philosophical problems do not altogether disappear; they still
apply to the first principles and take the form of a problem of their justifica-
tion. Evidently, it is a minimal logical condition that such a justification should
not be seen as a mathematical deduction of the principles from the theory in
whose very foundations they lie. The task of justification is external to the
reconstruction program and must be executed by the one with a different set of
presuppositions, i.e. by taking the theory for a given and motivating from there
why the principles in question are simple, physical, and plausible. Therefore,
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philosophy is not fully chased out of physics. On the contrary, by demarcat-
ing the frontier between what can be treated as a scientific question and what
belongs to metatheory, one contributes to a better understanding of the struc-
ture of the theory and of those of its foundational postulates which require a
metatheoretic interpretation and justification.
3 Examples of reconstruction
3.1 Early examples
A particularly well-known example of reconstruction is the special theory of
relativity. Since Einstein’s 1905 work special relativity is a well-understood
physical theory; but it is equally well-known that its formal content, i.e. Lorentz
transformations, were written by Lorentz and Poincare´ and not by Einstein, and
this several years before 1905. Lorentz transformations were fiercely debated and
many interpretations of what they mean were offered, and among them quite a
plausible one about interactions between bodies and the ether. However, when
Einstein came, things suddenly became clear and the debate stopped. This was
because Einstein gave a few simple physical principles from which he derived
Lorentz transformations, therefore closing the attempts to append philosophy
and give a meaning a posteriori, to an already working formalism. Einstein’s
idea was to assume that there is no absolute, but only a relative, notion of
simultaneity and that the velocity of light is constant. Once a derivation starting
from these principles has been taken through, the physical meaning of Lorentz
transformations stood clear and special relativity has not raised any controversy
ever since.
Einstein’s reconstruction of special relativity is an example of theory where
the first principles are understood as truths about reality. That the speed of
light is constant and that there is no absolute notion of simultaneity is now
routinely taken to be objectively true and well-established facts about nature.
Thus, we have here a case in which, although in general it is not a necessity, the
first principles do acquire a particular ontological status.
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Moving away from special relativity, we submit that reconstruction is the
exclusive way to make things clear about quantum mechanics. As such, this
idea is not novel but has been in the air for some time, and a concise statement
can for example be found in Rovelli [34],
Quantum mechanics will cease to look puzzling only when we will
be able to derive the formalism of the theory from a set of sim-
ple physical assertions (“postulates,” “principles”) about the world.
Therefore, we should not try to append a reasonable interpretation
to the quantum mechanical formalism, but rather to derive the for-
malism from a set of experimentally motivated postulates.
What is interesting is that in the last decade reconstruction became a ma-
jor trend in the foundations of quantum mechanics. But before describing this
recent work let us first look further back in the history of quantum mechan-
ics: there too axiomatic derivations occupy an eminent place. The first paper
where quantum mechanics was treated axiomatically appeared shortly after the
creation of quantum mechanics itself: in 1927 Hilbert, von Neumann and Nord-
heim stated their view of quantum mechanics as the one in which “(the theory’s)
analytical apparatus, and the arithmetic quantities occurring in it, receives on
the basis of the physical postulates a physical interpretation. Here, the aim is to
formulate the physical requirements so completely that the analytical apparatus
is just uniquely determined. Thus the route is of axiomatization” [18]. It is on
this route of axiomatization that von Neumann in collaboration with Birkhoff
was led to study the logic of quantum mechanics [2]. Following their work, many
axiomatic systems were proposed, e.g. Zieler [40], Varadarajan [38, 39], Piron
[28, 29], Kochen and Specker [22], Guenin [13], Gunson [14], Jauch [20], Pool
[32, 33], Plymen [31], Marlow [27], Beltrametti and Casinelli [1], Holland [19],
or Ludwig [24]. Another branch of axiomatic quantum theory, the algebraic ap-
proach was first conceived by Jordan, von Neumann and Wigner [21] and later
developed by Segal [35, 36], Haag and Kastler [15], Plymen [30], Emch [9] and
others; for a recent review, see [4].
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However, a vast majority of these axiomatic derivations do not fall under our
notion of reconstruction, as they were based on highly abstract mathematical
assumptions and not, as we required, on simple physical principles. Consider
for instance the exemplary work by Mackey [25, 26].
Mackey develops quantum mechanics as follows. Take a set B of all Borel
subsets of the real line and suppose we are given two abstract sets O (a to-be
space of observables) and S (a to-be space of states) and a (to-be probability)
function p which assigns a real number 0 ≤ p(x, f,M) ≤ 1 to each triple x, f,M ,
where x is in O, f is in S, and M is in B. Assume certain properties of p listed
in axioms M1-M9:
M1 Function p is a probability measure. Mathematically, we have p(x, f, ∅) =
0, p(x, f,R) = 1, and p(x, f,M1∪M2∪M3 . . .) =
∑∞
n=1 p(x, f,Mn) when-
ever the Mn are Borel sets that are disjoint in pairs.
M2 Two states, in order to be different, must assign different probability dis-
tributions to at least one observable; and two observables, in order to be
different, must have different probability distributions in at least one state.
Mathematically, if p(x, f,M) = p(x′, f,M) for all f in S and all M in B
then x = x′; and if p(x, f,M) = p(x, f ′,M) for all x in O and all M in B
then f = f ′.
M3 Let x be any member of O and let u be any real bounded Borel func-
tion on the real line. Then there exists y in O such that p(y, f,M) =
p(x, f, u−1(M)) for all f in S and all M in B.
M4 If f1, f2,. . . are members of S and λ1+λ2+ . . . = 1 where 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1, then
there exists f in S such that p(x, f,M) =
∑∞
n=1 λnp(x, fn,M) for all x in
O and M in B.
M5 Call question an observable e in O such that p(e, f, {0, 1}) = 1 for all f in
S. Questions e and e′ are disjoint if e ≤ 1− e′. Then a question
∑∞
n=1 en
exists for any sequence (en) of questions such that em and en are disjoint
whenever n 6= m.
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M6 If E is any compact, question-valued measure then there exists an observ-
able x in O such that χM (E) = E(M) for all M in B, where χM is a
characteristic function of M.
M7 The partially ordered set of all questions in quantum mechanics is isomor-
phic to the partially ordered set of all closed subspaces of a separable,
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
M8 If e is any question different from 0 then there exists a state f in S such
that mf (e) = 1.
M9 For each sequence (fn) of members of S and each sequence (λn) of non-
negative real numbers whose sum is 1, one-parameter time evolution group
Vt : S 7→ S acts as follows: Vt (
∑∞
n=1 λnfn) =
∑∞
n=1 λnVt(fn) for all t ≥ 0;
and for all x in O, f in S, and M in B, t→ p(x, Vt(f),M) is continuous.
In Mackey’s nine axioms all essential features of the quantum formalism are
directly postulated in their mathematical form: the Hilbert space structure in
M5-M8, state space and the probabilistic interpretation in M1-M4, and time
evolution in M9. It is not at all clear where these mathematical definitions
come from and how one justifies them on physical rather than formal grounds.
In fact, Mackey’s concern in the early 1950s was with a precise mathematical
axiomatization of quantum mechanics rather than with the question of what
quantum mechanics tells us about the world and then reconstructing its for-
malism from a set of such fundamental ideas. Thus, stage 1 of reconstruction,
at which one formulates physical principles, is absent from Mackey’s work, and
instead one starts directly at stage 2 where axioms appears as formal, mathe-
matical definitions.
Later, Mackey’s axioms M5-M8 were reformulated in the language of quan-
tum logic, thereby rephrasing the assumptions that underlie the Hilbert space
structure. This was the case, most prominently, in [20, 28, 29] and also in a sem-
inal book [1]. Quantum logical assumptions are simple enough to be accessible
for direct comprehension, in contrast to Mackey’s mathematically formulated
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axioms, but they tend to be linguistic rather than physical. This means that
one typically argues that it makes no sense to speak about certain terms other
than if some suitable “trivial” properties had been postulated, e.g. the notion
of proposition is only meaningful if like in Ref. [7] negation or partial order, or
like in Ref. [1] implication, are defined. Although we fully acknowledge that
linguistic a priori arguments can be interesting and powerful, we however sep-
arate them from the reconstruction program as introduced above: in the latter,
first principles from which the theory is derived should have a physical mean-
ing, i.e. tell us something directly and intuitively apprehensible about the world
and quantum theory as describing our knowledge of it. Such principles, ideally,
should be independent of a particular formalism in which we derive quantum
theory and therefore should not rely on the language of quantum logic as just
one among many such formalisms.
3.2 Contemporary examples
Among the modern developments, an interesting example of reconstruction
comes from the instrumentalist derivation of quantum theory from “five rea-
sonable axioms” by Hardy [16]. Hardy’s “reasonable axioms” set up a link
between two quantities, K and N , which play a fundamental role in the recon-
struction. K is the number of degrees of freedom of the system and is defined
as the minimum number of probability measurements needed to determine the
state. Dimension N is defined as the maximum number of states that can be
reliably distinguished from one another in a single measurement. The axioms
then are:
H1 Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion of
times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value for any
case where a given measurement is performed on an ensemble of n systems
prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n becomes infinite.
H2 Simplicity. K is determined by a function of N where N = 1, 2, . . . and
where, for each given N , K takes the minimum value consistent with the
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axioms.
H3 Subspaces. A system whose state is constrained to belong to an M dimen-
sional subspace behaves like a system of dimension M .
H4 Composite systems. A composite system consisting of subsystems A and B
satisfies N = NANB and K = KAKB.
H5 Continuity. There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system
between any two pure states of that system.
Although four of the H1-H5 axioms use mathematical language in the for-
mulation, their meaning in Hardy’s instrumentalist setting can be grasped much
easier than the meaning of Mackey’s axioms M1-M9. In fact, this meaning is
already suggested by the names given to the axioms by Hardy. Therefore H1-H4
can be rephrased into physical principles from which one derives the formalism
of the theory and thus provide an example of reconstruction. None of these prin-
ciples is trivial: for H1, assume that probability introduced instrumentally as
relative frequency of measurements is a well-defined concept and obeys the laws
of probability theory; for H2, assume that the number of parameters needed to
characterize a state is directly linked to the number of states that can be dis-
tinguished in one measurement; for H3, that the linear structure of state space
shrinks accordingly to the maximum number of states of the system distinguish-
able in one measurement; for H4, assume multiplicability of the quantity defined
as dimension and of the quantity defined as the number of degrees of freedom.
Now formulate these assumptions mathematically and use Hardy’s theorems to
derive from them the full-blown formalism of quantum mechanics. A particular
instrumental philosophy does not play a crucial role in the derivation: Hardy
himself acknowledges that his axioms can be adopted by a realist as well as
a hidden variable theorist or a partisan of collapse interpretations. Thus, the
choice of underlying philosophy is not critical for derivation, and Hardy’s recon-
struction advances our understanding of quantum theory irrespectively of the
justification which one may have for the axioms. What matters are the sim-
11
ple physical principles formulated as axioms H1-H4. We shall see an opposite
example in the next section, in which the justification used for fundamental
principles will limit the area in which operates the mathematical derivation.
Still, it is not so clear whether axiom H5 has a physical meaning. Because
it is this axiom that makes the theory quantum rather than classical, the re-
construction program cannot be said to be fully implemented and taken to its
logical conclusion. To further illustrate this point, we distinguish two types of
continuity assumptions that are made in axiomatic derivations of quantum the-
ory. Continuity assumptions of type 1 select the correct type of numeric field
which is used in the construction of the Hilbert space of the theory; namely,
of the field C of complex numbers. Sole`r’s theorem [37] or Zieler’s axioms [40]
are examples of type 1 continuity assumptions. Hardy’s case is different and
is an example of the continuity assumptions of type 2, which are made in or-
der to bring in the superposition principle. Other such assumptions include
Gleason’s non-contextuality [10], Brukner’s and Zeilinger’s homogeneity of pa-
rameter space [3], Landsman’s two-sphere property [23], and Holland’s axioms
C and D [19] which bear a particular resemblance to Hardy’s H5:
(C) Superposition principle for pure states:
1. Given two different pure states (atoms) a and b, there is at
least one other pure state c, c 6= a and c 6= b that is a
superposition of a and b.
2. If the pure state c is a superposition of the distinct pure
states a and b, then a is a superposition of b and c.
(D) Ample unitary group: Given any two orthogonal pure states
a, b ∈ L, there is a unitary operator U such that U(a) = b.
We see that various axiomatic systems of quantum theory contain, under one
form or another, the assumption of continuity and it is this assumption which
is largely responsible for making things quantum. Whatever the framework of
the reconstruction is, bringing in topological considerations is essential. As it is
exceedingly difficult to formulate a physical principle which may give a meaning
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to the continuity assumption of type 2, all reconstruction programs suffer here
from the intrusion of an element of mathematical abstraction.
The above critique concerning the continuity axiom applies to another ex-
amples of reconstruction initially proposed by Rovelli [34] and that we devel-
oped elsewhere [11, 12]. Here, the reconstruction starts from two information-
theoretic axioms:
R1 There exists a maximum amount of relevant information that can be ex-
tracted from a system.
R2 It is always possible to obtain new information about the system.
From these axioms and with the help of supplementary mathematical assump-
tions one derives the formalism of quantummechanics. While the supplementary
assumptions cast a shadow on the conceptual clarity of the reconstruction much
in the same fashion as does H5, the whole program presents itself differently
from Hardy’s instrumentalism. The mathematical derivation being still devoid
of ontological commitments, justification of the first principles which we propose
cannot refer to an ontology, except for an arguably problematic case in which
one would be prepared to take information for a fundamental building block of
reality. Rather, by reconstructing quantum theory from information-theoretic
principles we point at its epistemological character and at its role as a theory
of (a certain kind of) knowledge; i.e. with certain limits being imposed on the
kind of information one may be dealing with, the most general theory of this in-
formation takes the form of quantum theory. Here again reconstruction appears
more appealing than a mere interpretation as it leaves room for any justification
of the first principles different from ours. Indeed, one may wish to adopt an
ontological picture to justify R1-R2 or take no position at all with respect to
ontology. At the same time, regardless of a specific philosophical justification of
first principles, the meaning of quantum theory stands clear: quantum theory
is a general theory of information constrained by certain information-theoretic
principles.
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3.3 CBH reconstruction
Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (CBH) offer an example of a set of quantum infor-
mational postulates from which one derives the structure of quantum theory [6].
CBH postulate three fundamental principles:
CBH1 No superluminal information transfer via measurement.
CBH2 No broadcasting.
CBH3 No bit commitment.
To give a mathematical formulation of these principles, CBH use the C∗-
algebraic formalism. Consider a composite system, A + B, consisting of two
component subsystems, A and B, understood as C∗-algebras.
Definition 3.1. Operation T on algebra A∨B conveys no information to Bob
if
(T ∗ρ)|B = ρ|B for all states ρ of B. (1)
An operation here is understood as a completely positive linear map on an
algebra, and T ∗ρ is a state over the algebra defined for every state ρ on the
same algebra as
(T ∗ρ)(A) =
ρ(T (A))
ρ(T (I))
(2)
at the condition that ρ(T (I)) 6= 0. Nonselective measurements T are the ones
that have T (I) = I, and then ρ(T (I)) = ρ(I) = ||ρ|| = 1. CBH explain that, in
their view, Definition 3.1 entails
T (B) = B for all B ∈ B. (3)
CBH then assert that if the condition (3) holds for all self-adjoint B ∈ B
and for all T of the form
T = TE(A) = E
1/2AE1/2 + (I − E)1/2A(I − E)1/2, (4)
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where A ∈ A ∨ B with A and B being C∗-independent, and E is a positive
operator in A, then algebras A and B are kinematically independent, i.e. all
A ∈ A and B ∈ B commute [6, Theorem 1]. Thus kinematic independence is
derived from the assumption of C∗-independence and from the condition (1),
where C∗-independence is brought into the discussion to grasp the meaning of
the fact that systems A and B are distinct. Mathematically, C∗-independence
means that for any state ρ1 over A and for any state ρ2 over B there is a state ρ
over A ∨ B such that ρ|A = ρ1 and ρ|B = ρ2. As for Definition 3.1, the authors
take it to be a mathematical representation of Axiom CBH1.
According to the authors, the meaning of CBH1 is that when Alice and
Bob perform local measurements, Alice’s measurements can have no influence
on the statistics for the outcomes of Bob’s measurements, and vice versa. CBH
also say that “otherwise this would mean instantaneous information transfer be-
tween Alice and Bob” and “the mere performance of a local measurement (in the
nonselective sense) cannot, in and of itself, transfer information to a physically
distinct system.” Upon reading these statements, one has a feeling that for CBH
distinct and distant are synonyms. This identification of terms might indeed be
a tacit assumption among quantum information theorists who do not have to
worry about relativistic effects, but in the full-blown C∗-algebraic framework,
as well as in the general philosophical context, meaning of the two words is
certainly different. We have here an example showing how the initial quantum
informational language of the fundamental principles CBH1-CBH3 constrains
the use of the algebraic formalism to situations where fundamental principles
make sense from the point of view of quantum information, while in fact the
formalism could also be used in other, more complex situations. Unlike Hardy’s
derivation which was independent of the particular instrumental justification of
its fundamental principles, the CBH reconstruction cannot be taken through
outside the field of quantum information, because its mathematics, while being
still valid outside this field, will require additional justification. Apart from the
identification of terms ‘distant’ and ‘distinct,’ such is also the case with time
evolution, which is tacitly taken by CBH to be the usual quantum mechanical
15
time evolution, while in the general C∗-algebraic framework this is not at all
the case and a variety of different “temporal” evolutions are possible. One then
avoids this problem at the price of confining oneself to the quantum informa-
tional paradigm.
Equating Definition 3.1 with Axiom CBH1 requires particular attention to
the mathematical details, and a point has to be made about CBH’s proof. If,
following the authors, in this definition ρ is to be taken as a state over B,
then the definition does not make sense: operation T is defined on A ∨ B and
consequently, in accordance with (2), T ∗ρ is defined for the states ρ over A∨B.
If one follows the CBH definition with a state ρ over B, then there would be
no need to write ρ|B as CBH do, for a simple reason that ρ|B = ρ. To suggest
a remedy, we extend the reasoning behind this definition and reformulate it in
three alternative ways.
• The first one is to require that in Definition 3.1 the state ρ be a state over
the algebra A ∨ B.
• The second alternative is to consider states ρ on B but to require a different
formula, namely that (T |B)∗ρ = ρ as states over B.
• Finally, the third alternative proceeds as follows: Take arbitrary states
ρ1 over A and ρ2 over B and, in virtue of C∗-independence, consider the
state ρ over A∨B such that its marginal states are ρ1 and ρ2 respectively.
Then T ∗ρ is also a state over A ∨ B. If its restriction (T ∗ρ)|B is equal to
ρ2, then T is said to convey no information to Bob.
With the original formulation of Definition 3.1, proof of Equation 3 is prob-
lematic. We show how to prove this equation with each of the three alternative
definitions. First observe the following remark.
Remark 3.2. Each C∗-algebra has sufficient states to discriminate between any
two observables (i.e., if ρ(A) = ρ(B) for all states ρ, then A = B).
To justify (3), the CBH authors then say:
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(T ∗ρ)|B = ρ|B if and only if ρ(T (B)) = ρ(B) for all B ∈ B and for all
states ρ on A ∨ B. Since all states of B are restrictions of states on
A ∨ B, it follows that (T ∗ρ)|B = ρ|B if and only if ω(T (B)) = ω(B)
for all states ω of B, i.e., if and only if T (B) = B for all B ∈ B.
Let us examine this derivation under each of the three alternative definitions
of conveying no information. By the definition of T ∗, we have (T ∗ρ)(B) =
ρ(T (B)) for all states ρ over A ∨ B. To obtain from this that ρ(T (B)) = ρ(B),
one must show that (T ∗ρ)(B) = ρ(B), and this is equivalent to saying that
(T ∗ρ)|B = ρ|B for all states ρ over A ∨ B. Now, according to CBH, one would
need to show that ρ(T (B)) = ρ(B) if and only if ω(T (B)) = ω(B) with states
ρ over A ∨ B and ω over B. The latter formula, however, is not well-defined:
operator T (B), generally speaking, is not in B. Fortunately, we are salvaged by
the first alternative reformulation of Definition 3.1: because ρ(T (B)) = ρ(B) is
true for all states ρ over A ∨ B, we obtain directly that T (B) = B in virtue of
Remark 3.2.
The second alternative definition of conveying no information makes use of
an object such as (T |B)∗ρ. To give it a meaning in the algebra B, one needs to
impose a closure condition on the action of T on operators B ∈ B: namely, that
T must not take operators out of B. The problem here is the same as the one
we encountered in the discussion of the previous alternative, and it is only by
assuming the closure condition that one is able to obtain that T (B) = B.
In the third alternative, for the state ρ overA∨B, write from the definition of
T ∗ that (T ∗ρ)(B) = ρ(T (B)). The result (T ∗ρ)(B) is the same as (T ∗ρ)|B(B),
and this is equal to ρ2(B). Consequently, ρ(T (B)) = ρ2(B) = ρ(B). Can we
now say that this holds for all states ρ over A ∨ B ? The answer is obviously
yes, and this is because each state over A∨B can be seen as an extension of its
own restriction to B. Therefore, one has to modify Definition 3.1 for it to be
formally correct, and this entails a modification in the proof of Equation 3.
We now turn to the remaning two CBH axioms. Axiom CBH2 is used to es-
tablish that algebras A and B, taken separately, are non-Abelian. Broadcasting,
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which enters in the formulation of the axiom, is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3. Given two isomorphic, kinematically independent C∗-algebras
A and B, a pair {ρ1, ρ2} of states over A can be broadcast in case there is a
standard state σ over B and a dynamical evolution represented by an operation
T on A ∨ B such that T ∗(ρi ⊗ σ)|A = T ∗(ρi ⊗ σ)|B = ρi, for i = 0, 1.
Equivalence between the ‘no broadcasting’ condition and non-Abelianness
of the C∗-algebra is then derived from the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4. Let A and B be two kinematically independent C∗-algebras.
Then:
(i) If A and B are Abelian then there is an operation T on A∨B that broadcasts
all states over A.
(ii) If for each pair {ρ1, ρ2} of states over A, there is an operation T on A∨B
that broadcasts {ρ1, ρ2}, then A is Abelian.
It is interesting to note that non-Abelianness of the algebras A and B, taken
one by one, is proved by assuming that they are kinematically independent.
This means that quantumness, of which non-Abelianness is a necessary ingre-
dient, is not a property of any given system taken separately, as if it were the
only physical system in the Universe; on the contrary, to be able to derive the
quantum character of the theory, one must consider the system in the context
of at least one other system that is physically distinct from the first one. As a
consequence, for example, this forbids treating the whole Universe as a quantum
system if one reconstructs quantum theory along the CBH lines.
Axiom CBH3 entails nonlocality: spacelike separated systems must at least
sometimes occupy entangled states. In particular, CBH show that if Alice and
Bob have spacelike separated quantum systems, but cannot prepare any entan-
gled state, then Alice and Bob can devise an unconditionally secure bit com-
mitment protocol. The derivation starts by showing that quantum systems are
characterized by the existence of non-uniquely decomposable mixed states: a
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C∗-algebra A is non-Abelian if and only if there are distinct pure states ω1,2
and ω± over A such that
1
2
(ω1+ω2) =
1
2
(ω++ω−). This result is used to prove
a theorem showing that a certain proposed bit commitment protocol is secure
if Alice and Bob have access only to classically correlated states (i.e. convex
combinations of product states).
Theorem 3.5 (the CBH ‘no bit commitment’ theorem). If A and B are
non-Abelian then there is a pair {ρ0, ρ1} of states over A ∨ B such that:
1. ρ0|B = ρ0|B.
2. There is no classically correlated state σ over A∨B and operations T0 and
T1 performable by Alice such that T
∗
0 σ = ρ0 and T
∗
1 σ = ρ1.
From this theorem the authors deduce that the impossibility of uncondition-
ally secure bit commitment entails that “if each of the pair of separated physical
systems A and B has a non-uniquely decomposable mixed state, so that A ∨ B
has a pair {ρ0, ρ1} of distinct classically correlated states whose marginals rela-
tive to A and B are identical, then A and B must be able to occupy an entangled
state that can be transformed to ρ0 or ρ1 at will by a local operation.” The
term ‘separated’ is essential and, nevertheless, its precise meaning is not de-
fined. It can be, indeed, compared to the use of terms ‘distinct’ and ‘distant’
in the analysis of Axiom CBH1. When the authors claim that Alice and Bob
represent “spacelike separated systems,” while formally Alice and Bob are just
two C∗-algebras, one sees how the way in which CBH apply the algebraic for-
malism is severely constrained by the context of quantum information theory.
Here appears again a situation in which language and context used to formulate
and justify the fundamental principles set up a limit on the applicability of the
mathematical formalism in which these principles are then represented. Even
if the formalism can be understood more generally than within the discipline
chosen in order to comprehend the language, one still cannot make his way out
of this disciplinary prison or else the sense of the axioms will be lost. If one
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however persists and crosses the border and then, say, obtains a new mathe-
matical result, this result will be void of physical meaning until a new, broader
justification of the fundamental principles is given. Philosophical and linguistic
justification, and mathematical derivation play here a game of mutual onslaught
and retreat which, ultimately, leads to the advance of science.
The CBH result would be a perfect example of reconstruction were it not for
a great deal of mathematical structure which is tacitly assumed in the choice of
C∗-algebra as a mathematical representative of the notion of system. Assump-
tions of the algebraic formalism include the relations between operators abiding
by the linear law, numeric coefficients in algebras being complex numbers, the
states giving rise to the Hilbert space representation via the GNS construction,
etc. Once one lists all these supplementary assumptions, the CBH reconstruc-
tion appears once again to suffer from a similar defect of incorporating a serious
mathematical abstraction as derivations from axioms H1-H5 or R1-R2.
4 Conclusion
Reconstruction brings in clarity to where interpretation was struggling to make
sense of a physical theory. What belongs to physical theory is no more than
what is needed for its derivation. All other questions belong to metatheory
and are related to the metatheoretic justification task for the choice of first
principles.
The notion of reconstruction presented here resembles Einstein’s notion of
‘principle theory’. Principle theories, according to Einstein, “employ the an-
alytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and
starting point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered
ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoret-
ical representations of them have to satisfy” [8]. One recognizes here what we
have called justification of first principles and a statement that the mathemati-
cal derivation must follow after the principles had been established. Einstein’s
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distinction between constructive and principle theories, though, bears a heavy
flavor of his ontological view of relativity theory. For quantum theory, as Bub
first realized [5], Einstein’s notion of principle theory is still applicable although,
as we argued above, with a modified status of the first principles.
Reconstruction of quantum theory remains an only partially solved problem.
Notwithstanding, it is already competing with traditional interpretations due
to its appealing conceptual transparency and to the clarity that it brings into
the structure of the theory. It would be too ambitious to expect that all of
modern quantum theory, including field theory and quantum gravity, could be
derived from a few axioms; mathematical abstractions and further assumptions
are still a necessity. However, if we want to understand the meaning of even
most advanced parts of quantum theory, it is inevitable that simple physical
principles be formulated and put in the very foundation of quantum theory.
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